CNMC issues advisory report on first auction convening specific remuneration regime for high-efficiency cogeneration in Spain
Regulatory reviewCNMC's Sala de Supervisión Regulatoria issued its mandatory advisory report (Informe SUB/DE/001/26) on the Secretaría de Estado de Energía's draft Resolution convening the first auction to allocate the specific remuneration regime (RRE) to high-efficiency cogeneration installations under RD 530/2026 and Orden TED/672/2026. The report details the auction calendar (prequalification opening 13 Oct 2026, closing 1 Dec 2026, auction day 10 Dec 2026), ten products covering 600 MW across gas and biomass cogeneration ITRs, a marginal-pricing clearing mechanism, 10% quota over-allocation margin, divisible bid tranches, a 20 €/kW participation guarantee, and designation of OMIE/OMEL Diversificación as administering entity.
This is the first of several auctions intended to allocate 1,200 MW of specific remuneration to high-efficiency cogeneration, a technology whose output fell over 41% in Spain between 2021 and 2024. The auction design—marginal pricing, product segmentation across ten installation types, collateral levels and competition safeguards—will set the template for subsequent rounds and directly shapes investment incentives for industrial heat/power cogeneration renewal and new biomass CHP capacity.
CNMC's report is broadly supportive of the design (divisible tranches, 10% over-quota margin, 600 MW allocated in the first round) but flags unresolved structural risks: fragmentation of capacity across ten heterogeneous-quota products cleared independently could depress competition in smaller segments; the marginalist clearing mechanism (rather than the pay-as-bid approach CNMC previously recommended in IPN/CNMC/002/25) risks inframarginal surplus given asymmetric information on CHP plant economics; the 20 €/kW guarantee (one-third of the REER guarantee) and minimum 20% bid-to-quota ratio may need recalibration; and no mechanism exists to reallocate unawarded capacity between compatible products. CNMC recommends evaluating first-auction outcomes (participation, clearing discounts, concentration) before finalizing design parameters for subsequent auctions covering the remaining 600 MW toward the 1,200 MW target, and suggests safeguards against low-competitive-pressure awards similar to those adopted in a May 2026 demand-response procedure reform.
Ley 24/2013 (LSE) art.14.7; Real Decreto 413/2014; Real Decreto 530/2026; Orden TED/672/2026; Ley 3/2013 (CNMC creation, disposición transitoria décima)
Closing of prequalification and qualification documentation submission period · 1 Dec 2026