Where the evidence comes from.
Every page on this site rests on primary sources. This page lists them in full, and points to the research centres whose work on market design it follows.
Publications
Every source the site draws on, in one list: the legislation it reads, the decisions and monitoring it tracks, the operator documentation behind the figures, and the literature behind the analysis.
Work by the author
Vassilopoulos, P. & Lahmar, E. (2020). Wholesale Electricity Markets: From Theory to Practice. Palgrave Macmillan. — Liberalisation and its welfare case, marginal pricing and the long-term investment equilibrium, locational marginal pricing, nodal versus zonal design, missing money, derivatives and spot trading practice in the EU and US. Underpins much of the Energy Markets page.
Vassilopoulos, P. & Salah Abou El-Enien, A. (2013). The Intraday Paradigm: An Agile Market to Remunerate Flexibility and Integrate Intermittency. IHS CERA. — An early empirical microstructure study of the German continuous intraday market: forecast error as the structural driver, price formation near delivery, the liquidity snowball, and flexible plants earning multiples of their day-ahead margins.
Neuhoff, K., Ritter, N., Salah Abou El-Enien, A. & Vassilopoulos, P. (2016). Intraday markets for power: discretizing the continuous trading? EPRG Working Paper 1609 / Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1616, University of Cambridge. — Evidence from the German 15-minute intraday auction that adding an auction to continuous trading raises liquidity and market depth and lowers price volatility. Behind the intraday auctions discussion on the Energy Markets page. jbs.cam.ac.uk
Foundational texts in market design
Joskow, P. L. & Schmalensee, R. (1983). Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation. MIT Press. — The founding analysis of electricity deregulation: which parts of the power system can be opened to competition and which must stay regulated. It set out the questions the field has worked on ever since.
Schweppe, F. C., Caramanis, M. C., Tabors, R. D. & Bohn, R. E. (1988). Spot Pricing of Electricity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. — The book that founded locational (nodal) pricing: dispatch and price are derived together from the network's physics, so the price at each node carries marginal generation, losses and congestion. The intellectual root of locational marginal pricing in the US ISOs and of the nodal-versus-zonal debate on the Energy Markets page.
Stoft, S. (2002). Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity. IEEE Press / Wiley-Interscience. — The standard text on why electricity needs a designed market at all: the short-run price spike, the reliability and “missing money” problems, scarcity pricing and market power, built up from first principles to a full market design.
Seminal papers in market design
Bohn, R. E., Caramanis, M. C. & Schweppe, F. C. (1984). Optimal pricing in electrical networks over space and time. RAND Journal of Economics, 15(3), 360–376. — The formal case for spot prices that vary by location and by time; the paper behind nodal pricing. jstor.org
Hogan, W. W. (1992). Contract networks for electric power transmission. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 4(3), 211–242. — Introduces financial transmission rights, the hedge for the congestion component of nodal prices that makes a nodal market workable for participants. doi:10.1007/BF00133621
Chao, H.-P. & Peck, S. (1996). A market mechanism for electric power transmission. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10(1), 25–59. — The flowgate, or link-based, alternative to Hogan's point-to-point transmission rights: trade the physical constraints themselves. The other pole of the transmission-rights debate. doi:10.1007/BF00133357
Klemperer, P. D. & Meyer, M. A. (1989). Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty. Econometrica, 57(6), 1243–1277. — Firms bidding a whole supply curve rather than a single price or quantity: the theoretical engine behind almost all market-power analysis of electricity markets, applied to the British pool by Green & Newbery. jstor.org
Green, R. J. & Newbery, D. M. (1992). Competition in the British electricity spot market. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), 929–953. — The first hard analysis of market power in a liberalised power market, using the England & Wales pool, showing that a concentrated market would exercise it. doi:10.1086/261846
Fabra, N., von der Fehr, N.-H. M. & Harbord, D. (2006). Designing electricity auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(1), 23–46. — A formal comparison of uniform-price and discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for electricity, and what each does to bidding and to prices. The reference on auction format. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00002.x
Wilson, R. (2002). Architecture of power markets. Econometrica, 70(4), 1299–1340. — The synthesis of a decade of design questions — spot pricing, forward markets, transmission rights, market power — into one account of how the pieces of a power market fit together. doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00334
Borenstein, S. (2002). The trouble with electricity markets: understanding California's restructuring disaster. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 191–211. — The definitive post-mortem of the 2000–01 California crisis and what its design flaws taught the field about demand response, hedging and price caps. doi:10.1257/0895330027175
Joskow, P. L. & Tirole, J. (2007). Reliability and competitive electricity markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 38(1), 60–84. — The theory of scarcity pricing and reliability — value of lost load, price caps, and whether an energy-only market can deliver enough capacity. Behind the debate on the Adequacy & Capacity page. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00044.x
Joskow, P. L. (2008). Lessons learned from electricity market liberalization. The Energy Journal, 29(Special Issue 2), 9–42. — A wide survey of what two decades of restructuring across countries actually delivered, and where designs succeeded or failed. doi:10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol29-NoSI2-3
Cramton, P. & Stoft, S. (2005). A capacity market that makes sense. The Electricity Journal, 18(7), 43–54. — The design argument for a sloped demand curve for capacity, foundational to the US capacity markets. Behind the Adequacy & Capacity page. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2005.07.003
Cramton, P., Ockenfels, A. & Stoft, S. (2013). Capacity market fundamentals. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 2(2), 27–46. — Why an energy-only market may under-invest, and how a well-shaped capacity market corrects it. doi:10.5547/2160-5890.2.2.2
Borenstein, S. & Bushnell, J. (2015). The US electricity industry after 20 years of restructuring. Annual Review of Economics, 7, 437–463. — A measured verdict on what restructuring actually achieved across US regions, two decades in. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115630
Cramton, P. (2017). Electricity market design. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 33(4), 589–612. — The modern one-article survey of the whole field: energy, capacity, transmission and demand response. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx041
Academic and study literature
Dronne, T., Roques, F. & Saguan, M. (2021). Local flexibility markets for distribution network congestion-management in Center-Western Europe: which design for which needs? Energies, 14(14), 4113. doi:10.3390/en14144113
Scrocca, A., Daccò, E., Andreotti, D., Rancilio, G., Bovera, F., Falabretti, D. & Delfanti, M. (2026). Local flexibility markets in Europe: a critical review of market designs, operational maturity and stakeholder perspectives. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 226, 116434. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2025.116434
LBST, Öko-Institut & Trinomics (2025). Monitoring of the guarantees of origin system. Study for the European Commission under Article 19 of Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
Forschungsstelle für Energiewirtschaft (2025). How is the German smart meter rollout progressing? Analysis of Bundesnetzagentur monitoring data. ffe.de
Yao, S., Zhang, X., Liu, X., Wang, H., Leng, Y., Zhu, Y., Shang, N., Huang, G., Zhang, S., Ouyang, R., Zeng, J., Wang, Q. & Deng, R. (2026). Global renewable energy certificate systems: current status and development trends. Energies, 19(5), 1122. doi:10.3390/en19051122
I-TRACK Foundation. I-REC(E) market statistics and product code — issuance and redemption volumes for the international certificate market. trackingstandard.org
GHG Protocol. Scope 2 guidance revision — the 2025–26 consultation on hourly matching, deliverability and instrument quality tiers. ghgprotocol.org
Legislation
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast). Official Journal L 328. EUR-Lex
Directive (EU) 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity (recast). Official Journal L 158. EUR-Lex
Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, consolidated text of 5 June 2023. EUR-Lex
Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity. Official Journal L 158; consolidated text of 16 July 2024. EUR-Lex · consolidated
Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union's electricity market design. EUR-Lex
Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM). Official Journal L 197. EUR-Lex
Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2195 establishing a guideline on electricity balancing (EBGL). Official Journal L 312. EUR-Lex
European Commission (2025). Guidance on two-way contracts for difference, CELEX 52025XC06701. EUR-Lex
European Commission. EU emissions trading system: auctioning of allowances — summary of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010. EUR-Lex
European Commission. Electricity network codes and guidelines. energy.ec.europa.eu
European Commission. Capacity mechanisms. energy.ec.europa.eu
European Commission (2026). Legal framework enabling demand response, aggregation and consumer participation. energy.ec.europa.eu
European Commission. EU Emissions Trading System; Market Stability Reserve; Allowance auctions; ETS2 for buildings, road transport and additional sectors. EU ETS · MSR · auctions · ETS2
Regulatory decisions, methodologies and monitoring
ACER. Market monitoring reports — the annual series on wholesale electricity market functioning. acer.europa.eu
ACER (2025). Progress of EU electricity wholesale market integration. Market Monitoring Report. acer.europa.eu
ACER (2024). Monitoring of the implementation of the imbalance settlement harmonisation methodology — pricing models, settlement periods and additional components across the Union. acer.europa.eu
ACER. Electricity balancing: implementation monitoring. acer.europa.eu
ACER (2024). Decisions amending the implementation frameworks for the European aFRR, mFRR and imbalance-netting platforms and the balancing pricing methodology. acer.europa.eu
ACER. European Resource Adequacy Assessment, and (2026) the amended ERAA methodology. ERAA · 2026 amendment
All NEMO Committee. Harmonised maximum and minimum clearing price methodologies for single day-ahead and single intraday coupling (in force). nemo-committee.eu
ESMA (2025). EU carbon markets report. ESMA50-481369926-30552. esma.europa.eu
System and market operator documentation
ENTSO-E. PICASSO — the European platform for aFRR balancing energy: implementation framework, accession roadmaps and go-live communications. entsoe.eu
ENTSO-E. MARI — the European platform for mFRR balancing energy. entsoe.eu
ENTSO-E. TERRE — the replacement-reserve platform and the announcements covering the end of its operations in December 2025. entsoe.eu
ENTSO-E. Electronic data interchange library — implementation documentation for the European balancing processes. entsoe.eu
ENTSO-E & EU DSO Entity (2024). Joint proposal for a Network Code on Demand Response. entsoe.eu
Elexon. Imbalance pricing — the GB single marginal price, the PAR1 averaging rule and reserve scarcity pricing. elexon.co.uk
Elia. Scarcity pricing simulation. elia.be
ERCOT (2022). Biennial ERCOT report on the Operating Reserve Demand Curve. ercot.com
UK Power Networks. Flexibility: products, competition zones, tender hub and participation guidance, including the annual Flexibility Services Procurement Statement. dso.ukpowernetworks.co.uk
EPEX SPOT (2025, 2026). Localflex milestone releases for the UK Power Networks local flexibility market. epexspot.com
Association of Issuing Bodies. EECS Rules; facts and registry statistics; European Residual Mix. EECS Rules · facts · residual mix
RECS International. Public information on guarantee-of-origin market practice and participants. recs.org
Market data and trading venues
ENTSO-E. Transparency Platform — the generation, load, price and cross-border data behind the ANALYSE indicators. transparency.entsoe.eu
EEX. Guarantees of origin futures; EU ETS spot, futures and options; EU ETS primary auctions. GO futures · EU ETS · auctions
ICE Endex. EUA futures contract specifications. ice.com
EPEX SPOT. Guarantees of origin auctions. epexspot.com
UK Power Networks Open Data. Flexibility dispatches; flexibility tender data by postcode; high- and low-voltage flexibility zones by tender round. ukpowernetworks.opendatasoft.com
Research links
The universities, institutes and centres whose work on electricity market design this site follows.
Florence School of Regulation
European University Institute. The reference source on EU network codes, regulation and market integration, and the training ground for much of the sector.
Institute for Research in Technology (IIT)
Comillas Pontifical University. Long-standing centre for power system economics, regulation and network tariff design.
Energy Policy Research Group
University of Cambridge. Applied economics of electricity market liberalisation, competition and regulation.
Toulouse School of Economics
Industrial organisation and regulation applied to energy: market power, contract design and the economics of network industries.
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Independent research on electricity and gas markets, with a strong record on European market reform and the economics of the transition.
KU Leuven Energy Institute
Electricity market modelling, balancing and capacity mechanisms, and the interaction between market design and system operation.
TU Delft Energy
Power system engineering alongside the institutional economics of markets, congestion and flexibility.
DIW Berlin — Energy, Transport, Environment
Empirical and modelling work on European electricity markets, network expansion and decarbonisation policy.
Fraunhofer ISI — Energy Policy and Markets
Market design, flexibility and policy evaluation, with a deep evidence base on the German and European systems.
Imperial College Energy Futures Lab
System modelling, flexibility valuation and the cost of network reinforcement against demand-side alternatives.
ETH Zürich Energy Science Center
Cross-disciplinary work on power system operation, market coupling and the Swiss position in European markets.
DTU Wind and Energy Systems
Renewable integration, forecasting and balancing-market design, and the Nordic experience of high wind shares.
SINTEF Energy Research
Hydro-dominated system operation, reserve procurement and Nordic balancing market development.
Politecnico di Milano — Department of Energy
Distributed resources, local flexibility markets and the Italian pilot programmes.
MIT CEEPR
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research: applied economics of electricity markets, carbon pricing and regulation.
MIT Energy Initiative
The Future of… studies, including the reference work on distribution networks, storage and utility of the future.
Harvard Electricity Policy Group
Three decades of argument about wholesale market design, scarcity pricing and the operating reserve demand curve.
Energy Institute at Haas
UC Berkeley. Empirical energy economics: retail pricing, market power, and the distributional effects of tariff design.
Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center
US wholesale market operation, transmission policy and reliability economics.
Resources for the Future
Independent economic research on electricity regulation, carbon markets and the design of climate policy instruments.
Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets
UNSW Sydney. The National Electricity Market as a live experiment in high-renewable market design.
Agora Energiewende
Policy-facing analysis of European power market reform, flexibility and grid charges.
Bruegel
Economic policy research with a sustained line on EU energy market design and security of supply.